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1. Introduction
Agency theory argues that modern 
corporations characterized by highly diffused 
ownership are subject to conflicts arising from the 
separation of ownership and control. Because 
complete and contingent contracts are infeasible, 
managers end up with effective control rights in 
the use of firm resources. They tend to consume 
excessive perquisites and engage in opportunistic 
behavior at shareholders’ expenses. The agency 
costs can be mitigated by granting managers share 
ownership to align their interests with those of 
other shareholders. Managerial holdings serve as a 
credible guarantee of bearing the cost of not 
maximizing the value of shares.
Based on the agency theory, a large number 
of studies have been made on the relation between 
managerial ownership and firm performance, for 
example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. 
(1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996), Chung and Pruitt (1996), 
Loderer and Martin (1997), Chen and Steiner 
(1999), and Himmelberg et al. (1999). However, as 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) pointed out, 
because these studies differ in the measurements of 
firm performance and managerial ownership, and 
in whether and how the endogeneity of managerial 
ownership is taken into account in the estimation 
of the effect of ownership on performance, there is 
little agreement as to how managerial holdings 
affect firm performance. They conclude that 
viewed in totality, these studies cannot reject the 
belief that firm performance and managerial 
ownership are unrelated. This paper adds to the 
literature by investigating the managerial 
ownership in Taiwan. Two distinctive features in 
Taiwan’s corporate structures complicate the 
relation between managerial ownership and 
performance and raise several questions that are 
rarely considered in the US based studies.
The first feature is that Taiwan is a country 
whose economies are dominated by family-
controlled conglomerates. A large portion of listed 
companies is affiliated with business groups. 
Managerial ownership is a means through which 
families can obtain control over affiliated firms. 
Stock pyramids and cross-ownership, which are
widely observed among group members, suggest 
that managerial holdings in group firms may 
reflect the nature of an entrepreneur-run corporate 
sector more than a corporate governance problem.
The second feature is that there are two types of 
managers, one the individual managers and the 
other the representatives appointed by institutions 
that hold a substantial percentage of shares to take 
board or top management positions. Differences in 
the motivations and effects between holdings of 
individual and institutional managers were 
emphasized by Holderness and Sheehan (1988), 
but little attention has so far been given to this 
point in the literature.
Several questions connecting the 
ownership-performance relation with group 
affiliation and managerial identity then arise. Does 
the effect of managerial holdings on firm 
performance for Taiwan’s companies differ from 
that for US companies because of their distinctive
managerial ownership structures? Does the 
performance effect of managerial holdings hold 
equally for different identity of managers, namely, 
individual and institutional managers? How does 
the interrelation between managerial identity and 
group affiliation influence the performance effect
of managerial holdings? Recognizing the identity 
of managers also raises the possibility that the 
holdings of individual and institutional managers
correlate to each other. Does the correlation imply 
a substitution between two types of managerial 
holdings in the sense that an increase of one type 
3of holdings will cause a reduction of the other? 
How does substitution between both holdings 
change their effects on performance, and are there 
differences between group and non-group firms in 
how substitution affects the
ownership-performance relation?
Hypotheses about these questions are 
developed and tested by simultaneous equation 
models with panel data. The panel data are 
balanced containing information about 229 firms 
listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 1994 for 
the 1995-2000 period. After unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and period effects are controlled in 
the models, empirical results suggest managerial 
ownership to haves a significantly negative impact 
on firm performance. This impact confirms the 
argument that a higher level of managerial 
holdings in Taiwan’s companies reflects the 
strengthening of family control and the 
entrenchment of controlling shareholders’ benefits 
of control. Specifically, depending on whether the 
firm is group-affiliated or not, the holdings of 
individual and institutional managers have 
different roles in affecting firm performance. The 
results indicate the holdings of institutional 
managers in group firms to adversely affect 
performance most. This is due to the fact that the 
holdings of institutional managers tend to be a 
channel whereby the owners of group firms can 
easily arrange an ownership structure across group 
members to separate cash flow rights from voting 
rights.
Evidence also shows the holdings of 
individual and institutional managers to substitute 
for each other. Moreover, the important role of 
institutional managerial holdings in group firms 
brings about the findings implying that the 
substitution between both holdings is not 
symmetric, and that the degree of asymmetry 
varies with the firm’s status of group affiliation. 
The results finally show that the effects of 
individual and institutional managerial holdings on 
performance may change once the substitution 
between both holdings is taken into account.
The central idea of this study is that 
managers are not homogeneous in making 
corporate policies so that it is necessary to identify 
the heterogeneity of managers in analyzing the 
effect of managerial ownership on firm 
performance. By hypothesizing that the 
motivations and behaviors of managers may vary 
with managerial identity and firm organizations, 
this paper suggests that the firm owners, even they 
are controlling shareholders, should understand the 
relation between individual and institutional 
managerial holdings, the difference in the 
performance effects of both holdings, and how 
group affiliation affects this difference in order to 
arrange an efficient mix of managerial ownership.
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section I describes the issues for 
managerial ownership in Taiwan and develops
related hypotheses. Section II illustrates the 
empirical design and the data used in this study. 
Section III presents a discussion of empirical 
results, and section IV concludes the paper.
2. Issues and Hypotheses for  Manager ial 
Ownership in Taiwan
To understand the effect of managerial 
ownership on firm performance for Taiwan’s 
companies, two features of the management 
structure are noteworthy. The first feature is that 
many companies are affiliated to family-controlled 
business groups, and the second one relates to the 
identity of managers in terms of individual and 
institutional managers.
2.1 Family-Controlled Business Groups
Like several East Asian countries, the 
economies of Taiwan are dominated by family-
controlled conglomerates. Many large corporations 
in Taiwan are members of business groups, often 
family controlled. The members of a family, 
including the founder, his descendants, or the 
relatives through marriage, usually become the 
firm’s controlling shareholders.
The useful function in corporate control 
served by business groups has been discussed in 
the literature concerning Japanese keiretsu 
organizations, for example, Aoki (1990), Flath 
(1993), Berglof and Perotti (1994), and Kim and 
Limpaphayom (1998). The tight and long-term 
commercial relation in the keiretsu implies that 
group members can serve as mutual monitors 
because extensive information sharing within the 
keiretsu enables them to evaluate each other’s 
financial conditions, prospects, policies, and 
performances. However, Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
described the governance problems for group firms
in some emerging economies. Group affiliates 
generally have a greater lack of transparency in the 
locus of control over companies than unaffiliated 
firms have, and hence are more insulated from 
external monitors. In addition, group firms usually 
indulge in using political connections to solicit 
privileges from the government and to leave
financial intermediaries no incentive to monitor.
These problems are particularly severe if the 
groups are controlled by families that attempt to 
protect their privacy with little information about 
internal activities disclosed to the public.
The structure of controlling shareholders
makes worse the problem of lacking transparency 
4and outside monitors in business groups. Recent 
studies, for example, La Porta et al. (1999), 
Claessens et al. (2000), and Bebchuk et al. (2000), 
have emphasized that the separation between cash 
flow and control (voting) rights through dual class 
share structures, stock pyramids, and 
cross-ownership ties is usually used in conjunction 
with controlling-shareholder structures. Such 
schemes, which are called controlling-minority 
structures by Bebchuk et al. (2000), enable 
controlling shareholders (families) to exercise 
control over a firm while holding only a small 
fraction of the equity claims on cash flows.
Bebchuk (1999) argued that in countries where 
corporate laws are lax and hence private benefits 
of control are large, separating cash flow rights 
from voting rights is a common arrangement for 
corporate owners to take their companies public or 
to raise additional outside capital. 
Controlling-minority structures are believed to be 
useful in Taiwan’s family-controlled groups. In 
their study of East Asia countries by identifying 
the company’s ultimate control, Claessens et al. 
(2000) found that for Taiwan’s non-widely held 
companies, about 79.8% of sample companies 
have top managers being the relatives of the 
controlling shareholder’s family, 43.3% of them 
are controlled by a single shareholder, and 49% 
and 8.6% of them are controlled through pyramid 
structures and cross-holdings respectively. 
Because the top management is usually part of the 
controlling family and because substantial cash 
flow rights are not retained in addition to control, 
controlling shareholders, whose interests may 
conflict with those of other parties of the firm, 
have abilities and incentives to expropriate from 
minority shareholders.
Thus, one can expect that managerial 
ownership is negatively related to firm 
performance for Taiwan’s companies. Since 
management tends to be family-related, an 
increase of managerial ownership is likely to be 
perceived in the market as the reinforcement of 
family control over the firm or the exacerbation in 
the lack of transparency. It also represents the 
further deviation of cash flow rights from control 
rights and the entrenchment of private benefits of 
control for controlling shareholders. Because the 
agency problem arising from the expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling families is 
aggravated, higher managerial ownership will lead 
to a decrease in market-related performance of the 
firm. Moreover, the negative effect of managerial 
ownership on performance will be stronger for 
group firms than for non-group ones in that the 
controlling-minority structure is more likely to be 
formed through the arrangements of ownership 
across group members. While studies on US data 
generally do not find a significantly monotonic 
relation between managerial ownership and 
performance and resort to nonlinear specifications 
in ownership, the negative correlation predicted 
here reflects the special ownership structure in the 
management of Taiwan’s companies. 
2.2 The Identity of Managers
A notable feature in the management (board 
and top executives) of Taiwan’s companies is that 
it includes not only the individual shareholders and 
professional executives but the representatives
appointed by institutional investors that hold a 
substantial portion of corporate shares to take 
board or key management positions. Institutional 
investors in Taiwan include corporations, financial 
institutions, trust funds, government agencies, and 
foreign institutions. Through the institutional
managers, the institutions can directly secure their 
dominance and interests on the firm. Accordingly, 
there are two types of managerial ownership. One 
is the ownership of individual managers, and the 
other is the ownership of institutional managers, 
which represents the corporate shares held by 
institutions. 
The differences between holdings of 
individual and institutional managers in their 
motivations and effects have generally been 
ignored in the literature. In their study on the 
majority shareholders, Holderness and Sheehan 
(1988) emphasized the distinction between 
individual and corporate large-block shareholders. 
They found that firms with individual and 
corporate majority shareholders differ in their 
investment policies, corporate reorganizations, and 
firm performance. The greatest impact on firm 
value comes typically from individual, rather than 
corporate, majority shareholders. In a recent article 
studying the constraints on majority shareholders, 
Holderness and Sheehan (2000) also pointed out 
that when individuals rather than corporations are 
majority shareholders, the firms have fewer 
organizational constraints on management, such as 
a lower ratio of outside to inside directors or a 
lower debt to asset ratio.
Since almost all majority shareholders are 
directors and officers of the firms, studies by 
Holderness and Sheehan suggest the identity of 
managers in terms of individuals and corporations 
(institutions) to be an important element for 
understanding the relation between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. Individual 
managers have larger freedom of actions than 
managers who are retained by institutional
shareholders have. In addition, the incentive of 
5individual and institutional managers may differ. If 
diffusely held corporation A, as an institutional 
investor of corporation B, places representatives in 
the top managerial positions of B, the 
representatives of A would have little incentive to 
monitor (or to burgle) B because the benefits 
would accrue to all shareholders of A, not to the 
representatives themselves. Institutions may suffer 
from their own agency problems.1
The distinction between individual and 
institutional managers brings into question the 
relation between shareholdings of both parties. 
There is no theory proposed in the literature to 
suggest how they interact with each other.
However, based on the findings of Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988), because the same nature of 
ownership is held by two types of managers with 
different motivations in making policies, the 
relation between individual and institutional 
managers within the management tends to be 
competitive in view of obtaining control over the 
management and corporate decisions. While the 
size of ownership can properly represent the power 
over the management, one can predict that an 
increase in the holdings of one party crowds out 
the holdings of the other party, that is, there exists 
substitution between holdings of individual and 
institutional managers.2 Consequently, the effect 
__________________________________
__
1 This notion is related to the issue of whether the 
institutional investors can play an active role in 
corporate control. Several studies, for example,
Pound (1988), Brickley et al. (1988), McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), Shivdasani (1993), and Kang 
and Shivdasani (1995), provide evidence on how 
institutional investors affect the turnover of 
managers, the likelihood of a firm being taken over, 
the voting patterns in proxy contests, and the 
relation between directors’ ownership and 
performance. However, empirical results are not 
conclusive.
2 One may argue that when we cut a pie into 
pieces, if one is larger, the other must be smaller, 
and hence the so-called substitution effect is just 
statistical artifact. I do not think this is a proper 
argument for the present issue. Total managerial 
ownership of a firm changes over time (the size of 
the pie is not fixed). As can be seen in panel B of 
Table II, the mean value of total managerial 
ownership for the sample firms of this study drops 
by 5.5% (it is a substantial change) during 
1995–2000. For that reason, a decrease in the 
holdings of individual managers does not 
necessarily imply that the holdings of institutional
managers must increase. Indeed, the mean values 
of a change in individual (institutional) holdings 
can possibly be carried to firm performance 
through two channels: one is its direct effect on 
performance, and the other is the indirect effect on 
performance through institutional (individual) 
holdings as a result of substitution between both 
holdings. For example, suppose that both 
individual and institutional managerial holdings 
adversely affect performance and that the negative 
effect is stronger for institutional ones, the 
substitution effect will imply the possibility that an 
increase in individual holdings gives rise to higher 
performance even though the direct effect is to 
depress performance. The reason is that it can 
substitute for the shares of institutional managers, 
of which the negative impact on performance is 
more pronounced, to create a positive indirect 
effect large enough to offset the direct one. 
Examining the direct and indirect effects seems to 
be necessary once the identity of managers is taken 
into account.
2.3 Managerial Identity, Business Groups, and 
Ownership-Performance Relation
Incorporating the two features described 
above into the ownership-performance relation, 
hypotheses concerning how shareholdings of 
individual and institutional managers affect firm 
performance and how their effects vary with group 
affiliation can be built up.3
                                                                     
of both individual and institutional managerial
holdings decline during 1995–2000. Even though 
the decrease in one party’s holdings causes the 
other party’s holdings to increase, is the magnitude 
of the increase in individual holdings when 
institutional holdings decrease the same as that of 
the reverse case? If not, what leads to this 
asymmetric substitution? How does substitution 
vary with the group affiliation of the firm and 
affect the relation between managerial ownership 
and firm performance? The cutting-pie argument is 
too simple to answer these questions.
3 After the studies of La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Claessens et al. (2000) in investigating the issue of 
ultimate control, many researchers accept that an 
analysis of the causes and consequences of 
ownership cannot be properly performed for the 
countries where the controlling-minority 
ownership structures are common, for example, the 
East Asian ones, unless an ultimate ownership 
measure is used. However, hypotheses and 
empirical specifications of this study are still based 
on immediate ownership instead of ultimate 
control. One purpose of this study is to examine 
the different effects of individual and institutional 
6An important difference between shares held
by individual and institutional managers lies in that 
the ownership of institutional managers tends to be 
a medium through which the controlling- minority 
structure can be arranged. These arrangements 
help owners of firms hold small equity claims on 
cash flows without losing the voting rights. 
Compared with the holdings of individual 
managers, an increase in the holdings of 
institutional managers is thus more likely to 
represent the owner’s intention to strengthen the 
controlling-minority structure and to expropriate 
from minority shareholders. No matter what the 
firm organization is, either group or non-group 
firms, institutional managerial ownership is 
expected to have a larger magnitude of the 
negative (direct) performance effect than 
individual one has.
The difference in the performance effect 
between institutional and individual managerial 
ownership, however, is greater for group firms 
than for non-group ones. The controlling owners of 
group firms have greater incentives and abilities to 
arrange a controlling-minority structure because of 
their desire to secure control over group members 
and because the structure can be easily formed via 
the holdings of corporations, financial institutions, 
and other institutions within the groups. Therefore, 
the tendency of the enhancement of the owner’s 
controlling power and of a further deviation of 
cash flow rights from voting rights when the 
holdings of institutional managers increase will be 
stronger for group affiliates.
Furthermore, the direct effect of a particular 
type of managerial ownership (either institutional 
or individual) on firm performance will not hold 
                                                                     
managerial holdings on performance in firms with 
different status of group affiliation. This aim 
cannot be reached if the ownership is measured in 
ultimate control. Even though all holdings of 
individual and institutional managers directly or 
indirectly belong to the same controlling owners, I 
believe that changes in the holdings of individual 
and institutional managers will convey different 
information to the market and hence have different 
performance effects. It is not appropriate to argue 
that individual and institutional managers have 
homogeneous behavior and ignore the interrelation
between both parties just because they have the 
same controlling owners. To arrange an efficient 
managerial ownership structure, the owners of 
firms, even in the controlling-minority structures, 
have to understand the motivations and effects of 
holdings of different identity of managers.
equally for group and non-group firms, and both 
firm organizations also differ in the substitution 
between individual and institutional managerial 
ownership. Because the holdings of institutional 
managers can facilitate the arrangement of 
controlling-minority structures in business groups, 
they will have a larger impact on firm performance 
and be less likely to be replaced by individual 
managerial holdings for group firms than for 
non-group firms. However, it is not so straight to 
predict how group and non-group firms differ in 
the effect of individual managerial holdings and in 
the potential of its being replaced by institutional 
ones. Intuitively, since institutional holdings are 
crucial for the structure of business groups, the 
importance and the irreplaceable role of individual 
managerial ownership in affecting firm 
performance tend to be observed in non-group 
firms.
There may exist asymmetric substitution 
within managerial ownership in the sense that 
substitution of institutional for individual 
ownership is different from that of individual for 
institutional one. For both group and non-group 
firms, we can predict that the holdings of 
institutional managers are more likely to be 
replaced than individual managerial holdings are in 
that institutional investors usually have diverse 
portfolio holdings, and hence have a relatively 
weak will to stick to the holdings of a specific 
company. However, group firms are expected to 
have a smaller degree of asymmetric substitution 
than non-group firms have because as noted earlier, 
institutional holdings are useful for the owners of 
business groups to secure their group members as 
well as to obtain benefits from separation of cash 
flow rights and voting rights. This role increases 
the importance of institutional shares in group 
firms and reduces the potential of being replaced 
by individual holdings.
Under the premise that the direct 
performance effects of individual and institutional 
managerial holdings and the substitution effect 
between them are all negative, the indirect 
performance effects of both holdings must be 
positive. As a result, to what extent are the 
negative direct effects of both types of managerial 
holdings mitigated by the positive indirect effects 
in different organizations of the firm is an issue 
remained for empirical investigations.
In sum, Taiwan’s managerial ownership 
structure brings up several questions that connect 
the ownership-performance relation with
managerial identity and group affiliation. 
Hypotheses and issues proposed in this section are 
summarized in panel A of Table I. Testing these 
7hypotheses not only helps understand the relation 
between performance and distinctive ownership 
structures of Taiwan, but shares the notion 
emphasized by Holderness and Sheehan (1988, 
2000) to reveal different roles played by individual 
and institutional managers in determining firm 
performance.
3. Model Specification and Data
To address the questions I have posed, I 
employ two simultaneous equation models to 
examine a panel data set made up of Taiwan’s 
listed corporations. The first one is a two-equation 
model, in which total managerial shareholdings 
(MH) and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) are 
endogenous. The second one is a three-equation 
model, in which shareholdings of individual 
managers (MH-IND), shareholdings of 
institutional managers (MH-INST), and firm 
performance are endogenous. The purpose of using 
simultaneous equation models with panel data is to 
deal with the endogeneity of managerial ownership 
in studying its effect on firm performance.
The endogeneity of managerial ownership in 
regressing firm performance on managerial 
ownership can be considered in two folds. First, 
performance (the regressand) is at least as likely to 
affect ownership (the regressor) as ownership is to 
affect performance. That is, the causality between 
firm performance and managerial ownership can 
go either way. Previous studies using simultaneous 
equation models have generally accepted the 
argument that the ownership structure is 
endogenous and determined, among other 
observed factors, by firm performance. Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) pointed out that the insider 
information creates the incentive for managers to 
change their holdings according to their 
expectation of future firm performance, and that 
the performance-based compensation in the form 
of stock options also raises the possibility that firm 
performance is likely to affect managerial 
ownership.
Second, it is possible that the relation 
between performance and managerial ownership is 
neither a correlation running from ownership to 
performance nor a reverse correlation in which 
performance affects ownership, but rather a 
spurious relation attributed to unobserved 
heterogeneity among firms. Suppose there is an 
unobserved firm characteristic that is positively 
related to both performance and managerial 
ownership. If the variables for this unobserved 
characteristic are omitted from the specification, a 
regression of firm performance on managerial 
ownership will spuriously indicate a positive 
relation because managerial ownership is a 
positive proxy for this firm characteristic. Using 
panel data and assuming unobserved firm 
heterogeneity to be the “fixed individual effect” is 
a way to mitigate the endogeneity caused by the 
spurious relation. This method was emphasized in 
the study of Himmelberg et al. (1999). 
The structural equations for both models to 
be estimated are as follows.
Model 1:
MHit = m1 + a1i + d1t + b11Qit + b12SIZEit + 
b13AGEit + b14RISKit + b15RISKit2 + b16DEBTit + 
b17GROUPit + b18(Qit×GROUPit) + e1it,      (1)
Qit = m2 + a2i + d2t + b21MHit + b22ADVit + 
b23R&Dit + b24FIXit + b25DEBTit + b26GROUPit + 
b27(MHit×GROUPit) + e2it.      (2)
Model 2:
MH-INDit = m1 + a1i + d1t + g11MH-INSTit + g12Qit 
+ g13SIZEit + g14AGEit + g15RISKit + g16RISKit2 + 
g17DEBTit + g18GROUPit + g19(MH-INSTit×
GROUPit) + g110(Qit×GROUPit) + e1it,      (3)
MH-INSTit = m2 + a2i + d2t + g21MH-INDit + g22Qit
+ g23SIZEit + g24AGEit + g25RISKit + g26RISKit2 + 
g27DEBTit + g28GROUPit + g29(MH-INDit×
GROUPit) + g210(Qit×GROUPit) + e2it,        
(4)
Qit = m3 + a3i + d3t + g31MH-INSTit + g32MH-INDit
+ g33DEBTit + g34GROUPit + g35(MH-INSTit×
GROUPit) + g36(MH-INDit×GROUPit) + 
g37ADVit + g38R&Dit + g39FIXit + e3it.     
     (5)
i and t represent individual firm and period
respectively. Tobin’s Q appears as an explanatory 
variable in MH, MH-IND, and MH-INST 
equations because of the potential causality 
running from performance to ownership. In model 
2, to consider the substitution between holdings of 
individual and institutional managers, MH-INST is 
included as an explanatory variable in the 
MH-IND equation, and MH-IND is also an 
explanatory variable in the MH-INST equation.
MH is measured as the percentage of the firm’s 
common equity held by all directors and top 
executives. MH-IND and MH-INST are holdings 
of individual and institutional directors and top 
executives respectively. Tobin’s Q is defined as 
the ratio of the value of the firm to the replacement 
value of assets. The value of the firm is equal to 
the market value of common equity plus the 
market value of preferred stock plus the book 
value of total liabilities. The book value of total 
assets is proxy for the replacement value of assets. 
The annual values of MH, NH-IND, MH-INST, 
and Q are computed for the arrangement of panel 
data.
8Exogenous variables in both models include
firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), business risk 
(and its squared term) (RISK and RISK2), the 
value of debt (DEBT), advertising expenditures 
(ADV), research and development expenditures 
(R&D), expenditures on fixed capital (FIX), and 
the status of group affiliation (GROUP). The terms
interacting firm performance, total managerial 
holdings, individual managerial holdings, and 
institutional managerial holdings with the status of 
group affiliation, that is, Q×GROUP, MH×
GROUP, MH-IND×GROUP, and MH-INST×
GROUP, are added to the regressions.
Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the 
logarithm of the annual book value of assets. The 
larger is the firm size, the larger is the amount that 
has to be invested in the firm for a given fraction 
of equity. Financial constraints will prevent 
managers from owning a high percentage of equity. 
Moreover, to attain a given degree of control or to 
induce a given interest-converging incentive of 
managers, a smaller share of the firm is required as 
firm size increases. Both effects imply managerial 
ownership to decrease with firm size.
However, for the ownership structure of 
Taiwan companies, the size effect is more 
complicated. As already noted, Bebchuk’s (1999) 
idea suggests that in countries where capital 
markets and legal systems are not so developed 
that the private benefits of control are large, the 
companies’ owners have a strong incentive to sell 
cash flow rights without giving up control rights 
when they decide to extend the business through 
equity financing. That is, expansion in firm size is 
usually accompanied by the adoption of pyramids 
or cross-ownership. As a result, managerial 
ownership, particularly institutional managerial 
holdings, tends to grow with firm size. The 
negative size-ownership relation may not gain 
support in Taiwan’s data.
Firm age (AGE) is measured as the 
logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s 
first incorporation. The life-cycle theory suggests 
that younger firms are more likely to have 
concentrated ownership, while older firms are 
more frequently widely held. The annual business 
risk of the firm (RISK) is estimated as the standard 
deviation of the firm’s weekly stock market rates 
of return. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that 
greater payoff potential in maintaining tighter 
control in noisier environments will call for greater 
ownership concentration. Because managerial 
behavior is more difficult to monitor and more 
crucial in profitability when the firm’s 
environment is less predictable, higher risks will 
increase the value of incentive contracts with large 
managerial ownership. However, the cost of higher 
managerial holdings because of reduced portfolio 
diversification is raised as the risk increases. It is 
expected that business risks are positively related 
to managerial ownership, but the increase in 
ownership associated with a given increase in the 
risk diminishes. The squared value of the business 
risk (RISK2) is used to examine the nonlinear 
relation between risks and ownership.
The value of debt (DEBT) is measured as the 
ratio of annual book value of debt to total assets. 
According to Jensen’s (1986) “control hypothesis”
for debt, debt reduces the free cash flow available 
for spending at the discretion of managers by 
bonding managers’ promise to make the interest 
and principal payments. So in the ownership 
equation, a larger value of debt will be associated 
with lower managerial ownership because it 
reduces the importance of managerial ownership 
being a convergence-of-interest mechanism. In 
addition, if creditors do provide monitoring of 
management, debt issue can discourage managers 
to entrench themselves through larger 
shareholdings. The value of debt is also included 
in the performance equation to examine whether 
the benefits of debt in motivating managerial and 
organizational efficiency can exceed the agency 
costs of debt, suggested by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), to enhance firm performance.
Following the specification of Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), variables of advertising and 
R&D expenditures (ADV and R&D) and fixed 
capital expenditures (FIX) are included in the 
performance equation to control the accounting 
distortion in Tobin’s Q arising from the omission 
of intangible assets (advertising and R&D) in the 
denominator of the Q value and from the 
differences between accounting and true rates at 
which fixed assets are depreciated. ADV is 
measured as the ratio of annual advertising 
expenditures to annual sales, and R&D is the ratio 
of annual research and development expenditures 
to annual sales. FIX is measured by the ratio of 
annual expenditures on plant and equipment to 
annual sales. The accounting distortion caused by 
the depreciation rates is likely to take place for 
firms that fixed assets are important in the asset 
structure, that is, the value of FIX is large.
The main feature of above simultaneous 
equation models is the inclusion of the dummy 
variable GROUP, which is equal to one if the firm 
is affiliated to business groups, and its interaction 
terms with MH, MH-IND, MH-INST, and Q. 
These variables are purposed to examine the 
differences between group and non-group firms in 
the effect of total managerial ownership on firm 
9performance, in the roles played by individual and 
institutional managers to affect performance, in 
how substitution between the holdings of 
individual and institutional managers changes their 
respective effects on performance, and in how total, 
individual, and institutional managerial holdings 
respond to changes of performance.
Panel B of Table I restates the hypotheses 
developed in section I in terms of coefficients of 
the models. Both models are two-way fixed effects 
specification, in which the individual effects for 
each firm (dummy variables ai) and the time 
effects for each period (dummy variables dt) are 
both taken into account. One of the time effects 
must be dropped to avoid perfect collinearity. 
Since each of the individual effects is an 
individual-specific intercept but the time effects 
are comparisons to a base period, as suggested by 
Greene (2000), an overall constant (m) must be 
included to formulate a symmetric form of the 
model. All equations in both models are 
over-identified so that the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) methodology can be used. It must be noted 
that the terms interacting endogenous variables, 
MH, MH-IND, MH-INST, and Q, with GROUP 
are added to the models. Hence, the reduced form 
equations in the 2SLS method must be estimated
by including all exogenous variables and their 
products with GROUP as instruments.
The sample of this study is restricted to 
non-financial firms that were listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange in 1994 and had no missing data 
over the period 1995-2000. There are 282 listed 
companies in 1994. Twenty-nine financial firms 
and others with missing data on ownership for 
subsequent periods are excluded from the sample. 
The whole data panel is therefore balanced and 
includes 1374 observations for 229 firms.4 Except 
the variable GROUP, data required to calculate the 
variables defined above are collected from the 
database maintained by Taiwan Economic Journal.
Information about a firm’s affiliation with business 
groups is available from Business Groups in 
Taiwan published by China Credit Information 
Service, which provides the most reliable data for 
business groups of Taiwan. The status of the firm’s 
__________________________________
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4 The sample selection prevents entry and exit 
during 1995–2000. New firms and firms that go 
busted are likely to have abnormal transactions in 
the corporate shareholdings. To avoid econometric 
biases, it is not appropriate to add them to the 
firms with normal operation in examining the 
ownership-performance relation.
group affiliation may change during 1995-2000. 
Of 1374 observations, 741 are classified as group
affiliates.
4. Empir ical Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
Table II reports some summary statistics. 
Panel A contains descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the models, and panel B shows 
the changes in the mean values of managerial 
ownership and Q over the period 1995–2000. The 
mean values in panel A suggest that, relative to 
non-group firms, group affiliates have lower Q, 
higher percentages of total and institutional 
managerial holdings (MH and MH-INST), and
lower percentages of individual managerial 
holdings (MH-IND). All of these differences are 
significant at conventional levels. Also, the mean 
value of MH-INST is larger than that of MH-IND 
(almost double) for group firms, but is smaller for 
non-group firms. These results reflect the intention 
of group owners to take control of their member 
firms through the holdings of institutional 
managers. Group firms are also larger and older, 
have lower business risks, and sell less debt. The 
mean values of advertising, R&D, and fixed 
capital expenditures of group firms, however, are 
not significantly different from those of non-group
firms.
Panel B indicates that the mean values of 
MH, MH-IND, MH-INST, and Q decline 
simultaneously during the sample period. Relative 
to 1995, while the average Q of all sample firms 
drops by 0.816, from 1.648 to 0.832, in 2000, the 
mean values of MH, MH-IND, and MH-INST also 
decrease by 0.0549, 0.0451, and 0.01 respectively. 
It implies that for the pooled data, the period 
effects will strengthen or cause spurious positive 
relation between managerial ownership and Q, 
even though the relation does not exist or the true 
correlation is negative. Without controlling the 
period effects, the correlation between managerial 
ownership and performance is upward biased. 
Meanwhile, changes of MH-INST are relatively 
constant over periods suggesting that the decline in
MH is largely attributed to changes of MH-IND, 
and that the correlation between MH-IND and Q is 
biased by the period effects to a degree larger than 
that between MH-INST and Q.
Panel B also reveals that although the 
average Q’s of both group and non-group firms 
drop by around 48 % from 1995 to 2000, the 
reduction in MH for group firms (0.0394) is only a 
half of that for non-group firms (0.0734). Also, the 
declines in the mean values of MH-IND and 
MH-INST are similar for group firms (0.02 and 
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0.0194), but are different for non-group firms 
(0.0607 and 0.0127). These imply the differences 
between group and non-group firms in the 
correlation between managerial ownership and 
firm performance and in the bias of the 
ownership-performance relation caused by the 
period effects. 
To summarize, period effects are an 
important factor that has to be controlled in 
analyzing the relation between managerial 
ownership and performance, at least for the data of 
Taiwan’s companies. The correlations implied in 
panel B of Table I, however, do not suggest any 
causality. One cannot identify whether the 
movements of MH, MH-IND, MH-INST, and Q in 
the same direction during the sample period are the 
causality running from managerial ownership to 
performance or the reverse. A formal analysis of 
simultaneous equation models is necessary to solve 
this problem.
4.2 Ownership of All Managers and 
Per formance 
Empirical results of the simultaneous 
equation models are presented in Table III and IV. 
Table III reports the results of the model 1, in 
which the effect of total managerial holdings on 
performance is analyzed. Table IV is the results of 
the model 2, which emphasizes the different 
effects of individual and institutional managerial 
holdings on performance.
Panel A of Table III is the results for the MH 
equation, and panel B shows the results for the Q 
equation. I report estimated coefficients for (1) the 
regression with pooled data, where the individual 
firm effects (unobserved firm heterogeneity) and 
period effects are not controlled (ai = dt = 0) and an 
overall constant (m) is the intercept, (2) the 
regression controlling unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, where each of individual effects is 
an individual-specific intercept (ai) and m = dt = 0, 
and (3) the regression controlling both unobserved 
firm heterogeneity and period effects so that ai, dt, 
and m are required. To save the space, estimated 
results of ai and dt are not reported.
One may notice that for both non-group and 
group firms, after the firm effects are controlled 
(regression (2)), the significance for Q’s positive 
effect in the regression (1) of the MH equation 
disappears (the effect turns to negative for 
non-group firms), and the positive effect of MH in 
the Q equation increases remarkably. When the 
period effects are further controlled (regression 
(3)), the Q’s negative effect on MH is enhanced a 
little for non-group firms, but its effect remains 
insignificant for group firms. However, MH’s 
effect on Q has a significant change shifting from 
positive to negative for both group and non-group 
firms. In short, while unobserved firm 
characteristics bias both the effect of Q on MH and 
of MH on Q, the period effects merely influence 
the effect of MH on Q. Hence, as Table II suggests
that the period effects may create the positive 
correlation between MH and Q, results of Table III 
show that it is the effect of MH on Q (causality 
from MH to Q) to be affected by time. These 
findings confirm the importance of using panel 
data techniques to control unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and period effects in investigating 
the true relation between managerial ownership 
and performance.
Turning to the regression (3) where the firm 
and period effects have been controlled, the 
negative coefficient of Q in the MH equation 
implies that management of non-group firms tends 
to hold fewer (sell) shares when firms perform 
well, perhaps in the expectation that poorer 
performance will arrive in the subsequent periods. 
This kind of managerial behavior, however, cannot 
be seen for group firms. By adding up the 
coefficients of Q and Q×GROUP, the effect of Q 
on MH for group firms (shown at the bottom of 
panel A) is insignificant.
Unlike the findings of prior studies, firm size 
does not have a negative effect on managerial 
holdings. An insignificant coefficient of SIZE 
supports the argument that expansion of firm size 
in Taiwan is usually along with the pyramid and 
cross-ownership arrangements, which increase 
managerial holdings and offset the presumed 
negative size effect. As predicted by the life-cycle 
theory that dispersion of ownership is just a matter 
of time, a negative coefficient of AGE means old 
firms to have less concentrated managerial 
ownership.
The effects of business risks (RISK) and 
debt values (DEBT) on MH change considerably 
when unobserved firm heterogeneity is controlled, 
and remain stable as the period effects are further 
fixed. The coefficients of RISK and squared RISK 
indicate that a higher business risk increases the 
value of contracts using large managerial 
ownership as a monitoring mechanism, but that the 
increase in managerial ownership diminishes as the 
risk further increases because the non-
diversification costs of managerial holdings are 
getting large. Since the negative coefficient of 
DEBT is not significant, total managerial holdings 
are not shown to decrease if creditors are important 
to the monitoring of management.
Recall that differences in the mean values of 
RISK and DEBT between group and non-group 
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firms are significant in Table II. To distinguish 
these differences, I also run the regression with 
RISK×GROUP and DEBT×GROUP included in 
the MH equation (DEBT×GROUP is also added 
to the Q equation). In the regression (3’), the effect 
of RISK for group firms, obtained by adding up 
the coefficients of RISK and RISK×GROUP, is 
significant (p-value is 0.0008). Therefore, the 
response of MH to the change of RISK in the 
regression (3) is primarily attributed to the 
behavior of group firms. The risk effect is very 
weak for non-group firms. This seems to imply the 
flexibility of group firms to adjust managerial 
ownership in the face of high business risks, 
probably due to the mechanism of “internal capital 
market” formed by group members.
While DEBT almost has no effect for group 
firms (p-value is 0.605), it does have some 
negative effects on managerial holdings for 
non-group firms, although the significance is not 
very high (t-value is -1.556). The significant 
difference in the debt’s effect between group and 
non-group firms (the coefficient of DEBT×
GROUP) suggests that both firm organizations 
differ in the nature of managerial ownership. 
Increasing managerial holdings in group firms 
tends to be a strategy for controlling owners to 
keep control over member firms, and does not play 
the incentive mechanism to reduce agency costs.
The monitoring of creditors to substitute for 
managerial ownership in mitigating agency 
problems is less likely to be seen for group firms.
Coefficients of GROUP and Q×GROUP in 
the regression (3) indicate that for firms with Q 
less (larger) than 1.508, group affiliation tends to 
reduce (increase) MH.5 An unreported calculation 
reveals that the negative effect of group affiliation 
on MH is significant (p-value < 0.1) when Q is less 
than 1.095, and that the positive effect is 
significant (p-value < 0.1) if Q is larger than 2.345. 
For 1374 observations, 938 (68.3%) observations 
have Q less than 1.508 (negative affiliation effect), 
and 649 (47.2%) are in the range of significance 
(Q < 1.095). On the other hand, 436 (31.7%) 
observations have Q larger than 1.508 (positive 
affiliation effect), and only 131 (9.5%) are in the 
__________________________________
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5 Although Table II shows the mean value of MH 
to be larger for group firms than for non-group 
firms, we cannot say that the effect of group 
affiliation is to increase managerial holdings
before controlling other factors affecting MH or
considering its possible interaction with other 
variables, such as Q suggested here.
range of significance (Q > 2.345). For Taiwan’s 
companies, it seems that group affiliation is more 
likely to adversely affect MH or does not have 
significant impacts on MH. One explanation is that 
to attain a given level of Q, because of mutual
monitoring among group members, group firms 
may have less reliance on higher managerial 
holdings in the incentive contracts to mitigate 
agency problems. Another simple explanation is 
that echoing the findings on the value of debts, this 
result is caused by different roles played by 
managerial ownership in group and non-group 
firms. The level of managerial holdings for group 
owners to control their member firms is just lower
on the average.
For the Q equation of panel B, the regression 
(3) shows that MH has a significantly negative 
impact on Q for both non-group and group firms 
(b21 < 0 and b21 + b27 < 0). Greater ownership 
concentration by managers does lead to a more 
entrenched management and hence depress firm 
performance. The magnitude of MH’s negative 
effect is larger for group firms than for non-group 
firms (b27 < 0), although the difference is not 
significant. Supporting the hypothesis 1 and 2 
shown in Table I, a higher level of managerial 
holdings reflects the strengthening of family 
control and the entrenchment of controlling 
shareholders’ benefits, particularly for group firms 
in which the controlling-minority structure can be 
easily arranged. 
The effects of ADV and R&D are sensitive 
to unobserved firm heterogeneity and period 
effects. In other words, the panel data econometric 
method minimizes the measurement error in 
Tobin’s Q caused by the accounting distortion. The 
negative coefficient of FIX implies that the 
distortion arising from the difference between 
accounting and true depreciation rates reduce the 
Q value significantly. DEBT is positively related 
to Q. This effect is irrelevant to unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and period effects, and holds for 
both group and non-group firms. The control 
benefits of debt in motivating organizational 
efficiency are proved to exceed the agency costs of 
debt to enhance firm performance. The 
insignificant coefficients of GROUP and MH×
GROUP show that the benefit of group affiliation 
in improving firm performance is very weak and 
does not vary with the level of managerial 
holdings.   
4.3 Ownership of Individual and Institutional
Managers and Per formance 
Table IV is the regression results of the 
model 2 after controlling unobserved firm 
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heterogeneity and period effects.6 To clarify how 
group and non-group firms differ in the relation 
between MH-IND, MH-INST, and Q, Table V 
uses the estimated results of Table IV to report 
direct effects, indirect effects, which are derived 
from the substitution between holdings of 
individual and institutional managers, and total 
effects, which add up the direct and indirect effects, 
in four categories: the effect of Q on MH-IND, the 
effect of Q on MH-INST, the effect of MH-IND on 
Q, and the effect of MH-INST on Q. For example, 
in the category of “Q’s effect on MH-IND”, the 
total effect of Q on MH-IND for non-group firms 
is the sum of the direct effect (the coefficient of Q 
in the MH-IND equation, g12) and the indirect 
effect, which is the product when the Q’s effect on 
MH-INST (the coefficient of Q in the MH-INST 
equation, g22) is multiplied by the substitution of 
MH-INST for MH-IND (the coefficient of 
MH-INST in the MH-IND equation, g11), that is, 
g12 + g11×g22. Similarly, the total effect of Q on 
MH-IND for group firms is equal to (g12 + g110) + 
(g11 + g19) × (g22 + g210).
Focus on the substitution effect first. Table 
IV shows that for non-group firms, substitution of 
MH-IND for MH-INST (g21) is much more 
pronounced than that of MH-INST for MH-IND 
(g11), that is, g21 < g11. While 1% increase in 
MH-IND can substitute for 1.92% of MH-INST, 
only 0.38% reduction in MH-IND for 1% increase 
in MH-INST. Group firms also have this kind of 
asymmetric substitution between individual and 
institutional holdings (g21 + g29 < g11 + g19). They 
support the hypothesis 5 of Table I that the 
holdings of institutional managers are more likely 
to be replaced because the diverse portfolio of 
institutional investors prevents them from sticking 
to the holdings of a specific company. Meanwhile, 
g29 is shown to be larger than g19. Consistent with 
the hypothesis 5, the degree of asymmetric 
substitution is larger for non-group firms than for 
group firms. The control-securing and 
benefit-entrenching role of institutional ownership
in group firms reduces the likelihood of its being 
replaced by individual holdings. The fact that g19 < 
0 and g29 > 0 also supports the hypothesis 6 that the 
holdings of institutional managers are more 
difficult to be replaced by and more likely to 
__________________________________
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6 The pattern of how unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and period effects change the 
regression results is similar to Table III. Therefore,
only the results of the regression controlling both 
effects are reported.
substitute for holdings of individual managers in 
group firms than in non-group firms. 
In this study, I do not develop hypotheses 
about how performance affects the holdings of 
individual and institutional managers, but we can 
observe the difference between individual and 
institutional managers in responding to the change 
of performance from Table V. The direct effect of 
Q on managerial holdings, either MH-IND or 
MH-INST, for non-group firms is not significant. 
Since the indirect effects are trivial, the total 
effects remain insignificant. For group firms, both 
direct and total effects of Q on MH-INST are 
significantly negative. While the direct effect of Q 
on MH-IND is negligible, the Q’s effect on 
MH-INST along with the substitution of MH-INST 
for MH-IND create an important indirect effect to 
make the total effect of Q on MH-IND become 
positive. In sum, as firm performance changes, the 
incentive of managers to alter their holdings plus 
the adjustment of the ownership structure via the 
substitution between individual and institutional 
managerial holdings cause MH-IND and 
MH-INST of group firms to change in opposite 
directions.
Back to Table IV, for both group and 
non-group firms, either MH-IND or MH-INST has 
a direct effect that is negatively related to Q (g31 < 
0, g31 + g35 < 0, g32 < 0, g32 + g36 < 0) and the 
negative effect of MH-INST is stronger than that 
of MH-IND (g31 < g32, g31 + g35 < g32 + g36). They 
are consistent with the hypothesis 1 and 3. Also 
echoing the hypothesis 3, the finding that g35 is 
smaller than g36 suggests the difference between 
the effects of MH-INST and MH-IND to be larger 
for group firms than for non-group firms. The fact 
that g35 < 0 and g36 > 0 supports the notion of 
hypothesis 4. Institutional managerial holdings for 
group firms are connected with the arrangement of 
controlling-minority structures and the 
enhancement of the owner’s controlling power, 
and hence drive down firm performance at a larger 
extent.
Adding the indirect effect generated by 
substitution between MH-IND and MH-INST to 
the direct effect, Table V shows that for both group 
and non-group firms the total effect of MH-INST 
on Q remains significantly negative, but the 
magnitude is reduced. However, the indirect effect 
is large enough to turn the total effect of MH-IND 
into significant positive. The implication is that we 
may observe an increase in the holdings of 
individual managers to be beneficial to firm 
performance; however, the improvement in 
performance is caused by the individual holdings 
to substitute for the institutional ones, which are 
13
likely to depress more performance.
While the coefficient of GROUP is positive 
in the MH-IND equation, the negative coefficient 
of MH-INST×GROUP suggests that the positive 
affiliation effect on the holdings of individual 
managers decreases as the level of institutional 
holdings gets higher and will change to negative 
when the institutional holdings are high enough 
(MH-INST > 0.166). Similarly, although the effect 
of GROUP is negative in the MH-INST equation 
and can be enhanced as the Q value increases (the 
coefficient of Q×GROUP is negative), the 
coefficient of MH-IND×GROUP implies that 
group affiliation is positively related to the 
holdings of institutional managers as the individual 
holdings reach a higher level (MH-IND > 0.096 if 
Q is equal to one). Recall that Table II indicates 
group firms on the average to have higher 
institutional managerial holdings and lower
individual ones than non-group firms have. The 
results here suggest that the observations having 
large MH-INST or MH-IND are responsible for 
that evidence.
SIZE, AGE, RISK, ADV, R&D, FIX and 
DEBT in Table IV reveal similar information as in 
Table III. Some particular findings are worth 
mentioning. SIZE has a significantly positive 
impact on MH-INST but has no effect on MH-IND. 
Since institutional managerial ownership is closely 
related to controlling-minority structures, this 
result reinforces the notion that the firms’ owners 
usually use such ownership arrangements to 
expand firm size for not losing their control rights. 
Relative to its effect on total managerial ownership, 
RISK still positively affects individual and 
institutional managerial holdings, but the 
significance level is diminished. While DEBT’s
effect on total managerial holdings is not 
significant, evidence shows that after the 
interrelation between individual and institutional 
holdings has been considered individual and 
institutional managers reduce their holdings if
creditors exercise their monitoring of management. 
The benefit of group affiliation in increasing 
performance is weak and irrelevant to the level of 
total managerial ownership in Table III, whereas 
results here show that the irrelevance of total 
managerial holdings to the effect of group 
affiliation on performance is due to the fact that 
institutional and individual managerial holdings 
have opposite impacts on the 
affiliation-performance relation. The negative 
coefficient for MH-INST×GROUP and positive 
one for MH-IND×GROUP (t-value is lower) 
suggest the effect of group affiliation on 
performance to decrease with institutional 
managerial holdings but to increase with individual 
ones.
5. Conclusions
Family-controlled business groups and 
managerial ownership held by individual and 
institutional managers are two features 
characterizing the ownership structure of Taiwan’s 
corporations. They complicate the relation between 
managerial ownership and firm performance, and 
raise questions rarely considered in the literature. 
In this paper, I provide an empirical analysis to 
distinguish the impacts of individual and 
institutional managerial ownership on performance 
in different organizations of the firm, that is, group 
and non-group firms. A number of findings that 
are different or not available in the prior studies 
based on US data are obtained. It is notable that 
the empirical results of this study are not specific 
to Taiwan. They can be applied to several East 
Asian countries that have similar ownership 
structures.
Empirical results suggest that managerial 
ownership is negatively related to firm 
performance and that the effects of individual and 
institutional managerial holdings on performance 
vary with the firm’s status of group affiliation. 
Institutional managerial holdings have the 
performance effect larger than individual ones 
have for both group and non-group firms, but the 
difference between both effects is larger for group 
firms. In addition, for the holdings of institutional 
managers, their performance effect is larger in 
group firms than in non-group firms, while the 
reverse is true for the holdings of individual 
managers.
The results also show asymmetric 
substitution between holdings of individual and 
institutional managers. Substitution of individual 
for institutional holdings is more pronounced than 
that of institutional for individual ones for both 
group and non-group firms, but the degree of 
asymmetry is larger for non-group firms.
Meanwhile, the degree to which institutional 
(individual) managerial holdings can be replaced 
by individual (institutional) ones is lower (higher) 
for group firms than for non-group firms. All of 
these findings imply the importance and the 
irreplaceable role of institutional managerial 
ownership in business-group firms. Once the 
substitution between both holdings is taken into 
account, the negative impact of institutional 
managerial holdings on firm performance is 
mitigated, and that of individual holdings turns to 
positive.
Other explanatory variables, such as firm 
14
size and the value of debt, also provide indirect 
evidence to support the hypotheses proposed in 
this study. Accordingly, this paper leads us to 
conclude that the identity of managers, in terms of 
individual and institutional representatives, and its 
connection with the firm’s status of group 
affiliation could prove important for understanding 
the impact of managerial ownership on firm 
performance. 
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Table I.  Hypotheses for Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance
Panel A summarizes the hypotheses developed in section I. They connect the ownership-performance relation with 
managerial identity and group affiliation. Since both the effect of managerial holdings on firm performance and the 
substitution between individual and institutional managerial holdings are hypothesized to be negative, the comparisons 
made in the following hypotheses are based on the absolute values of the effects. Panel B describes the hypotheses in 
terms of the coefficients of the following two simultaneous equation models.
Model 1:
MHit = m1 + a1i + d1t + b11Qit + b12SIZEit + b13AGEit + b14RISKit + b15RISKit2 + b16DEBTit + b17GROUPit + b18(Qit×
GROUPit) + e1it
Qit = m2 + a2i + d2t + b21MHit + b22ADVit + b23R&Dit + b24FIXit + b25DEBTit + b26GROUPit + b27(MHit×GROUPit) + 
e2it
Model 2:
MH-INDit = m1 + a1i + d1t + g11MH-INSTit + g12Qit + g13SIZEit + g14AGEit + g15RISKit + g16RISKit2 + g17DEBTit + 
g18GROUPit + g19(MH-INSTit×GROUPit) + g110(Qit×GROUPit) + e1it
MH-INSTit = m2 + a2i + d2t + g21MH-INDit + g22Qit + g23SIZEit + g24AGEit + g25RISKit + g26RISKit2 + g27DEBTit + 
g28GROUPit + g29(MH-INDit×GROUPit) + g210(Qit×GROUPit) + e2it
Qit = m3 + a3i + d3t + g31MH-INSTit + g32MH-INDit + g33DEBTit + g34GROUPit + g35(MH-INSTit×GROUPit) + 
g36(MH-INDit×GROUPit) + g37ADVit + g38R&Dit + g39FIXit + e3it
Panel A. Hypotheses Panel B. Hypotheses in terms of 
Coefficients of the Models
Hypothesis 1 The direct effect of managerial holdings on 
performance is negative.
b21 < 0, b21 + b27 < 0, g31 < 0,
g31 + g35 < 0, g32 < 0, g32 + g36 < 0
Hypothesis 2 The direct effect of total managerial holdings on 
performance is larger for group firms than for 
non-group firms.
b27 < 0
Hypothesis 3 For both group and non-group firms, institutional 
managerial holdings have a larger direct effect on 
performance than individual ones have. However, 
the difference between the effects of institutional 
and individual holdings is larger for group firms 
than for non-group firms.
g31 < g32, g31 + g35 < g32 + g36,
(g32 + g36) – (g31 + g35) > (g32 – g31)
Þ g36 > g35
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Hypothesis 4 The direct effect of institutional managerial 
holdings on performance is larger for group firms 
than for non-group firms. Conversely, the direct 
effect of individual managerial holdings on 
performance is larger for non-group firms than for 
group firms.
g35 < 0, g36 >0
Hypothesis 5 For both group and non-group firms, there exists 
asymmetric substitution between individual and 
institutional managerial holdings. Substitution of 
individual for institutional holdings is stronger 
than that of institutional for individual ones. 
However, the degree of asymmetric substitution is 
larger for non-group firms than for group firms.
g21 < g11, g21 + g29 < g11 + g19,
(g11 + g19) – (g21 + g29) < (g11 – g21)
Þ g29 > g19
Hypothesis 6 The degree to which institutional managerial 
holdings can be replaced by individual ones is 
lower for group firms than for non-group firms.
Conversely, the degree to which individual 
managerial holdings can be replaced by 
institutional ones is lower for non-group firms 
than for group firms.
g29 > 0, g19 < 0
Hypothesis 7 For both group and non-group firms, how the 
indirect effects derived from the substitution 
between individual and institutional managerial 
holdings change their respective direct effects
requires empirical investigations.
g31 + (g32 × g11) = ?,
g32 + (g31 × g21) = ?, 
(g31 + g35) + (g32 + g36) × (g11 + g19) = ?, 
(g32 + g36) + (g31 + g35) × (g21 + g29) = ?
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Table II.  Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in the regression models. Q is defined as the ratio of the value of the firm to the replacement value of assets. 
For firm value, I use the market value of common equity plus the market value of preferred stock plus the book value of total liabilities, and for the replacement value 
of assets I use the book value of total assets. MH, MH-IND, MH-INST represent the percentage of the firm’s common equity held by total managers, individual 
managers, and institutional managers respectively. SIZE is the logarithm of the annual book value of assets; AGE is the logarithm of the number of years since the 
firm’s first incorporation; RISK is estimated as the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly stock market rates of return; ADV is the ratio of annual advertising 
expenditures to annual sales; R&D is the ratio of annual research and development expenditures to annual sales; FIX is the ratio of annual expenditures on plant and 
equipment to annual sales; and DEBT is the ratio of annual book value of debt to total assets. The sample is 229 non-financial companies listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange in 1994 and had no missing data over the period 1995-2000. The whole data panel is thus balanced and includes 1374 observations for 229 firms. The status 
of the firm’s group affiliation may change over time. Of 1374 observations, 741 are classified as group firms.
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Models
All Firms (N=1374) Group Firms (N=741) Non-Group Firms (N=633)
Std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max.
0.8172 0.0372 6.4913 1.1949 *** 0.7237 0.0658 4.9670 1.4496 0.8959 0.0372 6.4913
0.1361 0.0075 0.8242 0.2374 * 0.1447 0.0478 0.8187 0.2235 0.1249 0.0075 0.8242
0.1114 0.0000 0.7056 0.0835 *** 0.1021 0.0000 0.5473 0.1227 0.1181 0.0000 0.7056
0.1489 0.0000 0.8241 0.1539 *** 0.1622 0.0000 0.8186 0.1008 0.1259 0.0000 0.8241
1.0519 13.3731 19.2476 16.4227 *** 1.0067 13.7936 19.2476 15.3718 0.7879 13.3731 18.9117
0.2879 2.4849 4.0775 3.5326 *** 0.2879 2.5650 4.0775 3.4554 0.2824 2.4849 4.0254
0.0215 0.0047 0.2008 0.0591 *** 0.0198 0.0222 0.1341 0.0639 0.0231 0.0047 0.2008
0.0214 0.0000 0.3454 0.0081 0.0201 0.0000 0.3454 0.0080 0.0228 0.0000 0.2121
0.0146 0.0000 0.1449 0.0071 0.0128 0.0000 0.0946 0.0078 0.0165 0.0000 0.1449
0.7491 0.0000 6.2327 0.7350 0.6549 0.0000 5.5895 0.7921 0.8456 0.0015 6.2327
0.0714 0.0000 0.6433 0.0787 *** 0.0560 0.0000 0.4487 0.0910 0.0856 0.0000 0.6433
Panel B. Mean Values of Managerial Ownership and Tobin’s Q, 1995–2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
0.2612 0.2467 0.2352 0.2231 0.2134 0.2063 
0.1264 0.1145 0.1047 0.0955 0.0869 0.0813 
0.1348 0.1322 0.1305 0.1276 0.1265 0.1249 
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1.6480 1.4728 1.5455 1.3190 1.0561 0.8320 
0.2541 0.2630 0.2520 0.2306 0.2211 0.2147 
0.0935 0.0915 0.0859 0.0835 0.0773 0.0735 
0.1606 0.1715 0.1661 0.1471 0.1438 0.1412 
1.5251 1.3539 1.3779 1.2299 1.0351 0.7871 
0.2671 0.2309 0.2189 0.2120 0.2020 0.1937 
0.1537 0.1369 0.1230 0.1136 0.1013 0.0930 
0.1134 0.0940 0.0959 0.0984 0.1007 0.1007 
1.7503 1.5886 1.7087 1.4517 1.0874 0.8989 
* and *** denote that the mean values are significantly different between group and non-group firms at the 0.10, and 0.01 significance level respectively. Mean 
differences are tested using t-test with unequal variances.
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Table III.  Estimated Coefficients for Total Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance Equations
The following simultaneous equation model is estimated for the regression (1) – (3) using 2SLS methodology:
MHit = m1 + a1i + d1t + b11Qit + b12SIZEit + b13AGEit + b14RISKit + b15RISKit2 + b16DEBTit + b17GROUPit + b18(Qit×GROUPit) + e1it,
Qit = m2 + a2i + d2t + b21MHit + b22ADVit + b23R&Dit + b24FIXit + b25DEBTit + b26GROUPit + b27(MHit×GROUPit) + e2it.
MH is the percentage of the firm’s common equity held by all managers. Q is the ratio of the value of the firm to the replacement value of assets. For firm value, I use the 
market value of common equity plus the market value of preferred stock plus the book value of total liabilities, and for the replacement value of assets I use the book value of 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of the annual book value of assets; AGE is the logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s first incorporation; RISK is estimated as 
the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly stock market rates of return; RISK2 is the squared value of RISK; DEBT is the ratio of annual book value of debt to total assets; 
ADV is the ratio of annual advertising expenditures to annual sales; R&D is the ratio of annual research and development expenditures to annual sales; FIX is the ratio of 
annual expenditures on plant and equipment to annual sales; and GROUP is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the firm is affiliated to business groups. The 
interaction terms of GROUP with MH and Q are also included in the regressions. In the regression (3’), additional terms that interact GROUP with RISK, RISK2, DEBT, and 
MH are added. The sample is 229 non-financial companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 1994 and had no missing data during 1995-2000. The regression (1) use 
pooled data (ai = dt = 0 and m is the intercept); the regression (2) controls unobserved firm heterogeneity only (ai is the individual-specific intercept and m = dt = 0); and the 
regression (3) controls unobserved firm heterogeneity and period effects (ai, dt, and m are all required). At the bottom of panel A, I also report the effects of Q, RISK, and 
DEBT on MH for group firms by adding up the coefficients of themselves and their interaction terms with GROUP. Similarly, at the bottom of panel B, the effects of MH and 
DEBT on Q for group firms are reported. The estimated results of ai and dt are not reported in the table.
Panel A. MH Equation
(1) Pooled (2) Firm Effects (3) Firm and Period Effects (3’) Firm and Period Effects
0.4314 (5.349)*** 1.3367 (4.796)*** 1.4565 (4.903)***
0.0330 (4.184)*** -0.0198 (-1.532) -0.0230 (-1.766)* -0.0364 (-2.287)**
0.0022 (0.526) 0.0013 (0.169) 0.0042 (0.552) 0.0001 (0.019)
-0.0748 (-5.794)*** -0.3632 (-5.598)*** -0.3293 (-3.931)*** -0.3301 (-3.797)***
-0.3916 (-0.617) 0.6172 (2.098)** 0.6931 (2.158)** 0.0550 (0.148)
-3.3669 (-0.786) -5.0805 (-2.662)*** -5.8158 (-2.874)*** -3.0372 (-1.328)
0.1109 (2.048)** -0.0409 (-0.602) -0.0430 (-0.639) -0.1275 (-1.556)
0.0284 (1.614) -0.0377 (-2.403)** -0.0383 (-2.447)** -0.1504 (-4.196)***
-0.0047 (-0.400) 0.0245 (2.207)** 0.0254 (2.294)** 0.0496 (3.067)***
1.7454 (2.879)***
-9.0834 (-2.209)**
0.1672 (2.009)**
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0.0801 0.8921 0.8963 0.8974
0.0283 (p = 0.0006) 0.0047 (p = 0.7129) 0.0024 (p = 0.8549) 0.0132 (p = 0.3265)
1.8004 (p = 0.0008)
0.0397 (p = 0.6050)
Panel B. Q Equation
(1) Pooled (2) Firm Effects (3) Firm and Period Effects (3’) Firm and Period Effects
0.8155 (11.050)*** 2.2802 (7.101)*** 2.3252 (6.644)***
1.9396 (7.080)*** 9.9319 (9.430)*** -4.3128 (-3.357)*** -4.4437 (-3.298)***
-1.9725 (-2.013)** -0.1908 (-0.113) -0.3271 (-0.299) -0.3481 (-0.317)
14.0601 (9.786)*** -0.6617 (-0.173) 2.6399 (1.061) 2.6995 (1.081)
-0.0469 (-1.654)* -0.1198 (-1.253) -0.2477 (-3.923)*** -0.2501 (-3.932)***
1.5803 (5.336)*** 1.9490 (1.974)** 1.9435 (3.008)*** 1.7859 (2.207)**
0.0542 (0.592) -0.3359 (-1.096) 0.2767 (1.365) 0.2827 (1.389)
-1.3039 (-3.627)*** 1.9204 (1.489) -0.8863 (-1.035) -1.0122 (-1.076)
0.3085 (0.324)
0.1491 0.2982 0.7072 0.7070
0.6357 (p = 0.0022) 11.8523 (p < 0.0001) -5.1991 (p = 0.0006) -5.4559 (p = 0.0014)
2.0944 (p = 0.0087)
t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively.
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Table IV.  Estimated Coefficients for Individual Managerial Ownership, 
Institutional Managerial Ownership, and Firm Performance Equations
This table shows the estimated results of the following simultaneous equation model using 2SLS methodology:
MH-INDit = m1 + a1i + d1t + g11MH-INSTit + g12Qit + g13SIZEit + g14AGEit + g15RISKit + g16RISKit2 + g17DEBTit + 
g18GROUPit + g19(MH-INSTit×GROUPit) + g110(Qit×GROUPit) + e1it,
MH-INSTit = m2 + a2i + d2t + g21MH-INDit + g22Qit + g23SIZEit + g24AGEit + g25RISKit + g26RISKit2 + g27DEBTit + 
g28GROUPit + g29(MH-INDit×GROUPit) + g210(Qit×GROUPit) + e2it,
Qit = m3 + a3i + d3t + g31MH-INSTit + g32MH-INDit + g33DEBTit + g34GROUPit + g35(MH-INSTit×GROUPit) + 
g36(MH-INDit×GROUPit) + g37ADVit + g38R&Dit + g39FIXit + e3it.
MH-IND and MH-INST represent the percentage of the firm’s common equity held by individual and institutional 
managers respectively. Q is the ratio of the value of the firm to the replacement value of assets. For firm value, I use
the market value of common equity plus the market value of preferred stock plus the book value of total liabilities, 
and for the replacement value of assets I use the book value of total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of the annual book 
value of assets; AGE is the logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s first incorporation; RISK is estimated as 
the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly stock market rates of return; RISK2 is the squared value of RISK; DEBT is 
the ratio of annual book value of debt to total assets; ADV is the ratio of annual advertising expenditures to annual 
sales; R&D is the ratio of annual research and development expenditures to annual sales; FIX is the ratio of annual 
expenditures on plant and equipment to annual sales; and GROUP is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the 
firm is affiliated to business groups. The interaction terms of GROUP with MH-IND, MH-INST, and Q are added to 
the regressions. The sample is 229 non-financial companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 1994 and had no 
missing data during 1995-2000. The effects of MH-INST, MH-IND, and Q for group firms are reported at the bottom. 
The estimated results of ai and dt are not reported in the table.
MH-IND Equation MH-INST Equation Q Equation
Constant (m) 1.0069 (4.867)*** 2.3411 (5.030)*** 3.1048 (7.235)***
MH-INST -0.3764 (-2.584)*** -8.1211 (-4.090)***
MH-IND -1.9204 (-4.587)*** -6.0621 (-3.427)***
Q 0.0017 (0.170) 0.0102 (0.658)
SIZE 0.0035 (0.637) 0.0289 (2.943)***
AGE -0.2588 (-4.425)*** -0.7033 (-4.630)***
RISK 0.1662 (0.695) 0.1833 (0.581)
RISK2 -2.1795 (-1.411) -2.5646 (-1.324)
DEBT -0.0768 (-1.647)* -0.1820 (-2.343)** 1.8264 (2.817)***
GROUP 0.0274 (1.849)* -0.0309 (-1.705)* 0.1408 (0.674)
MH-INST×GROUP -0.1656 (-1.949)* -3.2496 (-2.735)***
MH-IND×GROUP 1.2023 (4.222)*** 2.1390 (1.584)
Q×GROUP -0.0072 (-0.643) -0.0846 (-2.616)***
ADV -0.5330 (-0.487)
R&D 4.3741 (1.650)*
FIX -0.2768 (-4.341)***
Adj. R2 0.9271 0.9311 0.7088
The Effect of MH-INST 
for Group Firms
g11 + g19 = -0.5420      
(p = 0.0072)
g31 + g35 = -11.3707   
(p < 0.0001)
The Effect of MH-IND  
for Group Firms
g21 + g29 = -0.7181     
(p = 0.0015)
g32 + g36 = -3.9231    
(p = 0.0388)
The Effect of Q       
for Group Firms
g12 + g110 = -0.0055     
(p = 0.5730)
g22 + g210 = -0.0744     
(p = 0.0017)
t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively.
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Table V.  Summary for the Relation between Ownership of Individual and 
Institutional Managers and Firm Performance
This table uses the estimated results of the following simultaneous equation model (the results of Table IV): 
MH-INDit = m1 + a1i + d1t + g11MH-INSTit + g12Qit + g13SIZEit + g14AGEit + g15RISKit + g16RISKit2 + g17DEBTit + 
g18GROUPit + g19(MH-INSTit×GROUPit) + g110(Qit×GROUPit) + e1it,
MH-INSTit = m2 + a2i + d2t + g21MH-INDit + g22Qit + g23SIZEit + g24AGEit + g25RISKit + g26RISKit2 + g27DEBTit + 
g28GROUPit + g29(MH-INDit×GROUPit) + g210(Qit×GROUPit) + e2it,
Qit = m3 + a3i + d3t + g31MH-INSTit + g32MH-INDit + g33DEBTit + g34GROUPit + g35(MH-INSTit×GROUPit) +
g36(MH-INDit×GROUPit) + g37ADVit + g38R&Dit + g39FIXit + e3it,
to report direct effects, indirect effects, which are derived from the substitution between shareholdings of 
individual and institutional managers, and total effects, which add up the direct and indirect effects, in four 
categories: Q’s effect on MH-IND, Q’s effect on MH-INST, MH-IND’s effect on Q, and MH-INST’s effect on 
Q. MH-IND and MH-INST represent the percentage of the firm’s common equity held by individual managers 
and institutional managers respectively. Q is the ratio of the value of the firm to the replacement value of assets. 
For firm value, I use the market value of common equity plus the market value of preferred stock plus the book 
value of total liabilities, and for the replacement value of assets I use the book value of total assets. SIZE is the 
logarithm of the annual book value of assets; AGE is the logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s first 
incorporation; RISK is estimated as the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly stock market rates of return; 
RISK2 is the squared value of RISK; DEBT is the ratio of annual book value of debt to total assets; ADV is the 
ratio of annual advertising expenditures to annual sales; R&D is the ratio of annual research and development 
expenditures to annual sales; FIX is the ratio of annual expenditures on plant and equipment to annual sales; and 
GROUP is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the firm is affiliated to business groups. The interaction 
terms of GROUP with MH-IND, MH-INST, and Q are added to the regressions. The sample is 229
non-financial companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 1994 and had no missing data during 
1995-2000. Significance levels can be obtained from Table IV. Numbers in the parentheses of Total Effect are 
the total effects when the insignificant direct and indirect effects are replaced by zero.
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Q’s Effect on MH-IND:
Non-Group Firms g12 g11 × g22
0.0017 (-0.3764)*** × (0.0102) -0.0021 ( 0)
Group Firms g12 + g110 (g11 + g19) × (g22 + g210)
-0.0055 (-0.5420)*** × (-0.0744)*** 0.0348 ( 0.0403)
Q’s Effect on MH-INST:
Non-Group firms g22 g21 × g12
0.0102 (-1.9204)*** × (0.0017) 0.0069 ( 0)
Group Firms g22 + g210 (g21 + g29) × (g12 + g110)
-0.0744*** (-0.7181)*** × (-0.0055) -0.0705 ( -0.0744)
MH-IND’s Effect on Q:
Non-Group Firms g32 g31 × g21
-6.0621*** (-8.1211)*** × (-1.9204)*** 9.5337
Group Firms g32 + g36 (g31 + g35) × (g21 + g29)
-3.9231** (-11.3707)*** × (-0.7181)*** 4.2422
MH-INST’s Effect on Q:
Non-Group Firms g31 g32 × g11
-8.1211*** (-6.0621)*** × (-0.3764)*** -5.8393
Group Firms g31 + g35 (g32 + g36) × (g11 + g19)
-11.3707*** (-3.9231)** × (-0.5420)*** -9.2444
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively
